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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All issues presented for appellate review originate from the final Ruling denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce issued by the Honorable Paul D. 
Lyman of the Sixth District Judicial Court. Accordingly, all issues relating to the trial 
court's ruling were preserved for appeal with the Notice of Appeal. 
1. Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree of Divorce when the trial court failed to adequately consider 
Respondent's arguments that the default Decree of Divorce was obtained without 
adequate notice to Respondent and in violation of her due process rights. 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of statutes or rules of procedure is a question 
of law, and accordingly, the Appellate Court grants no deference to trial court's 
decisions, but reviews them for correctness. See Pangea Technologies, Inc. v. 
Internet Promotions, Inc., 94 P.3d 257, 259 (Utah 2004); see also Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225, 1227 (Utah 2001). 
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by 
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.) 
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2. Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree of Divorce when the trial court failed to make adequate findings 
to support its decision. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination will not be reversed except for 
abuse of discretion. See May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984); see 
also Pacer Sport and Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975). 
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by 
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached 
hereto as Exhibit"A" to Respondent's Brief.) 
3. Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on her mistake and excusable neglect. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See Fisher v. 
Bybee, 104 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Utah 2004); see also Lund, 11 P.3d 277 at 280-281. 
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by 
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.) 
4. Issue No. 4: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on Petitioner's actions of fraud or 
misrepresentation regarding his willingness to enter into a divorce stipulation. 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See 
Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200; see also Lund, 11 P.3d at 279. 
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by 
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.) 
Issue No. 5: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on of Petitioner's actions of intentional 
fraud or misrepresentation and intentional non-disclosures to the trial court 
regarding material facts relevant to the divorce action. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See 
Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200; see also Lund, 11 P.3d 277 at 280-281. 
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by 
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.) 
Issue No. 6: Whether the trial court erred in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside the Decree of Divorce when Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on her prior counsel's ineffective 
assistance. 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside 
judgment will only be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion. See 
Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200; see also Lund, 11 P.3d 277 at 280-281. 
Preserved for Appeal: Respondent preserved and asserted her right to appeal by 
timely filing a Notice of Appeal of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 249-251, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" to Respondent's Brief.) 
RELEVANT STATUTES/RULES 
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the 
local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, 
the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time 
begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed 
shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which 
event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed, 
without reference to any additional time provided under subsection (e), is less 
than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
excluded in the computation. 
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by 
order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte 
application. 
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period of after the service of a notice or other 
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days 
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under 
subjection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the 
computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, except that if the last 
day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period 
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shall run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal 
holiday. 
(A copy of Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" to Respondent's Brief.) 
Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery... the court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just, and among others the following:... 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying 
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a 
judgment by default against the disobedient party 
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
If a party . . . fails . . . (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories 
submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to 
serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, 
after proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on 
motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among 
others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), (C) of 
Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule . . . . 
(A copy of Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C" to Respondent's Brief.) 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment 
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
Page 5 of 50 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or 
(3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(A copy of Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D" to Respondent's Brief.) 
Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing 
in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after 
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to 
the withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the entry of the decree or 
entry of default. An affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the 
application. The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to support 
necessary findings of fact and a final judgment. 
(A copy of Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "E" to Respondent's Brief.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
This divorce action was initiated by Petitioner Van O. Peterson on a Verified 
Complaint for Divorce filed against Respondent Korrin Peterson (R. 1-9). The Honorable 
Paul D. Lyman granted Petitioner's Motion for Default and Evidentiary Hearing on the 
basis that Respondent did not attend the Evidentiary Hearing and did not produce the 
requested discovery and a final Decree of Divorce was entered on December 9, 2004 (R. 
132-140). Respondent's position is that the trial court erred, on numerous grounds, in not 
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setting aside the default Decree of Divorce in that it was entered without properly 
complying with due process requirements, that the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings to support its decision, that Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set aside 
the default Decree of Divorce based on Respondent's mistake and excusable neglect, that 
she set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the default Decree of Divorce based on 
Petitioner's actions of fraud or misrepresentation regarding his willingness to enter into a 
divorce stipulation, that Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the default 
Decree of Divorce based on Petitioner's actions of intentional fraud or misrepresentation 
and intentional non-disclosures to the trial court regarding material facts relevant to the 
divorce action, and that she set forth sufficient grounds to set aside the default Decree of 
Divorce based on her prior counsel's ineffective assistance (R. 163-172). 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Without a hearing on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, the 
Honorable Paul D. Lyman of the Sixth Judicial District Court, issued a Ruling denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce on the basis Respondent had 
received sufficient notice of the Evidentiary Hearing but simply chose not appear or have 
counsel present (R. 247-248, a copy of the Ruling is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" to 
Respondent's Brief). Respondent properly and timely filed her Notice of Appeal on May 
23, 2005. (R. 249; see also Exhibit "A".) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Respondent Korrin Peterson and Petitioner Van 0. Peterson were married on July 
29,1999, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada (R. 153 at | 
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1; R. 176 at T| 3). There have been two children born as issue of this marriage, to 
wit: Savanna K. Peterson, born October 18, 1999; and Sydney G. Peterson, born 
May 22,2002 (R. 153 at 12; R. 176 at If 4). 
2. During the parties' marriage and until approximately October of 2003, 
Respondent's role in the marriage was that of a stay-at-home mother (R. 153 at f 
3; R. 176 at ^ f 6). During that period of time, Respondent was the children's 
primary caretaker, in that she provided for their daily physical and emotional well-
being, comforted them and provided love, encouragement and support when 
needed (R. 153 at Tf 3; R. 176 at f 6). Respondent also prepared the children's 
meals, and was primarily responsible to care for them when they were ill, 
including staying up with them, taking them to the doctor, and giving them 
medications as needed (R. 153 at ^  3; R. 176 at 16). Respondent was, and 
continues to be an able, competent and capable care provider for the two minor 
children (R. 153 at H 3; R. 176 at T| 6). 
3. On approximately December 6, 2003, Petitioner forced Respondent to leave the 
marital home (R. 154 at ]f 5; R. 176 at ^  7). When Petitioner threw Respondent 
out, she was only able to take with her one suitcase full of clothes and her car and 
was obligated to live with a friend in Mayfield for a few days before moving to 
Pleasant Grove, Utah (R. 154 at 15; R. 176 at f 7). 
4. In addition to throwing Respondent out of the marital home, without Respondent's 
knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly took cash and the credit cards from 
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Respondent's wallet, took her house key, and cancelled Respondent's charge 
account at the local gas station (R. 154 at ^ 6; R. 176 at 17). 
5. Without Respondent's knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly and 
immediately withdrew almost all of the money from both of the parties' joint 
checking and savings accounts (R. 154 at 17; R. 176 at f 8). Petitioner took 
approximately $2,500 from the parties' joint savings account at the Gunnison 
Valley Bank, and between $7,000 to $9,000 from the parties' joint checking 
account at Zion's Bank (R. 154 at 17; R. 176 at ^ 8). Petitioner admits that he 
withdrew the funds from the parties' joint checking accounts on the basis that he 
did not trust her. (R. 226 at ^ 7.) Prior to this affidavit, Petitioner did not admit to 
Respondent or inform the trial court that he had taken the funds. Nowhere does 
Petitioner state that he has placed the "disputed funds" in a trust account during the 
resolution of this divorce action. (R. 224-229.) 
6. Without Respondent's knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly and 
immediately removed Respondent as a beneficiary on their medical and dental 
insurance plan (R. 155 at | 8; R. 177 at f^ 9). Petitioner admits he removed 
Respondent from his medical insurance plan. (R. 226 at j^ 8.) 
7. Without Respondent's knowledge or permission, Petitioner secretly removed her 
as the beneficiary of the Petitioner's life insurance policy (R. 155 at f^ 9; R. 177 at 
110). Petitioner admits that he removed Respondent as the beneficiary of his life 
insurance policy. (R. 226 at ^ 8.) At the time of the separation, the policy was 
valued at approximately $150,000 to $170,000 (R. 155 at If 9; R. 177 at Tf 10). 
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8. Petitioner literally threw Respondent out of the marital home and wrongfully took 
and converted joint property and assets without a right or proper judicial process or 
Respondent's permission (R. 155 at 110; R. 177 at f 11). 
9. On or about December 18, 2003 Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce 
(R. 1-9). 
10. Respondent retained her first counsel near the end of December 2003. Respondent 
timely gave her first counsel all the requested information that was necessary to 
file a timely Answer (R. 155 at f 12; R. 177 at 112). 
11. Shortly after being served with Petitioner's Divorce Petition, Respondent was 
released from her employment at Wal-Mart because she complained to 
management of sexual harassment by a co-worker (R. 155 at 113; R. 177 at f 13). 
After her wrongful release from Wal-Mart, she went to live in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah with her mother (R. 155 at 113; R. 177 at 113). 
12. On or about January 12, 2004, Respondent commenced a part-time job at Gold's 
Gym making $5.50 per hour (R. 155 at f 14; R. 177 at If 14). Respondent 
maintained this job until approximately June of 2004. During this time, 
Respondent was also searching for better paying employment (R. 155 at 114; R. 
177 at 114). 
13. On January 16, 2004, Respondent's prior counsel showed up late to the Order to 
Show Cause Hearing, and even though Respondent had given him all the 
necessary information, her prior counsel was not adequately prepared to represent 
her best interests (R. 155 at f 15; R. 178 at f 15). 
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14. Respondent's counsel convinced Respondent to agree to allow Petitioner 
temporary custody of the children during the pendency of the divorce action, even 
though Respondent did not think it was the appropriate action or that it was in the 
children's best interest (R. 155 at f 16; R. 178 at If 16). 
15. On approximately February 5, 2004, Respondent commenced a new job at Pointe 
Break Gas Station making $7.00 per hour (R. 155 at Tf 17; R. 178 at 117). This 
was later increased to $7.50 per hour (R. 155 at f 17; R. 178 at f 17). Respondent, 
as of the date she filed her Motion to Set Aside, was working at Pointe Break Gas 
Station foil time (R. 155 at 117; R. 178 at If 17). 
16. During February of 2004, Respondent would regularly call her prior counsel, 
sometimes even calling more than one time in a day, leaving several messages in 
an attempt to learn the status and disposition of her case (R. 156 at ^ 18; R. 178 at 
118). Respondent's prior counsel would not return any of her phone calls in 
February (R. 156 at 118; R. 178 at If 18). 
17. On or about February 23, 2004, Respondent was involved in a roll-over accident 
that totally destroyed her Ford Explorer and left Respondent severely injured (R. 
156 at Tf 19; R. 178 at ^ 19). Petitioner does not deny that Respondent was 
involved in a terrible car accident or that the injuries she sustained were quite 
severe. (R. 224-229). The injury was severe enough to require physical therapy, 
which had to be postponed to a future time to allow her muscles to strengthen and 
because of the high degree of pain and the migraines it caused (R. 156 at % 19; R. 
178 at Tf 19). Moreover, because of the injury to her left leg, side, hip and neck, 
Page 11 of 50 
Respondent has been required to undergo substantial chiropractic treatment (R. 
156 at f 19; R. 178 at If 19). During the first eight weeks, she had treatments 
approximately three times a week (R. 156 at f^ 19; R. 178 at f^ 19). During the 
next four weeks, she had treatments approximately one to two times a week (R. 
156 at f 19; R. 178 at f 19). At the time Respondent filed her Motion to Set Aside, 
she was receiving treatment every two weeks (R. 156 at % 19; R. 178 at 119). Her 
injury from the roll-over accident was so severe that she is still currently suffering 
from frequent headaches as well as debilitating migraines (R. 156 at % 19; R. 178 
at f 19). At times the migraines were so severe that she is rendered incapacitated 
and unable to function properly for a few days (R. 156 at [^ 19; R. 178 at ^ 19). 
On about March 2,2004, Respondent had reconstructive surgery to repair a hole in 
her breast caused by the removal of a large lump in August of 2003 (R. 157 at f 
20; R. 179 at^ f 20). Because of Respondent's destitute financial circumstances, 
she was unable to afford the necessary reconstructive surgery so her mother paid 
for the surgery (R. 157 at f^ 20; R. 179 at f^ 20). Respondent repaid this debt from 
the proceeds of the check received from the insurance company for the salvage 
value of her totaled Ford Explorer (R. 157 at If 20; R. 179 at % 20). Petitioner 
acknowledges that Respondent had a lump removed from her breast, but 
nevertheless, describes her reason for reconstructive surgery as disingenuous 
because he believed the lump to be "small." (R. 227 at ^ 12.) 
On or about March 5, 2004, Petitioner purportedly served upon Respondent, 
Discovery Requests (R. 34-35). 
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20. Respondent was overwhelmed by Petitioner's Discovery Requests and sought the 
assistance of her prior counsel to comply with the Discovery Requests (R. 157 at f^ 
21; R. 179 at Tf 21). Respondent called her prior counsel on numerous occasions 
with respect to questions concerning Petitioner's Discovery Requests, however, 
Respondent's prior counsel generally ignored Respondent's calls (R. 157 at f^ 21; 
R. 179atl21). 
21. In March of 2004, Respondent continued to experience considerable pain from her 
accident and continued to undergo regular treatment from her chiropractor (R. 157 
at!22;R. 178 at If 19). 
22. In April of 2004, Respondent's prior counsel finally returned her numerous phone 
calls. During the conversation, Respondent explained to her prior counsel that she 
did not understand Petitioner's Discovery Requests and needed assistance to 
complete them (R. 157 at f 24; R. 179 at ^ 22). Her prior counsel simply told her 
to answer and comply with Petitioner's Discovery Requests and to return them to 
his office (R. 157 at 124; R. 179 at Tf 22). 
23. On or about April 20, 2004, without warning or notice and without assisting 
Respondent in complying with Petitioner's Discovery Request, Respondent's 
counsel unexpectedly withdrew as counsel while Petitioner's Discovery Requests 
were still pending and unanswered (R. 40-41). 
24. On or about April 21, 2004, Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel Response to 
Discovery and for Sanctions (R. 42-43). 
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25. In April of 2004, Respondent continued to experience considerable pain from her 
roll-over accident and continued to undergo regular chiropractic therapy (R. 158 at 
127; R. 178 at % 19). 
26. On or about May 11, 2004, Respondent called her prior counsel and again asked 
him for assistance in complying with Petitioner's Discovery Requests (R. 158 at f 
28; R. 180 at Tf 23). At this point her prior counsel told Respondent that he was no 
longer her counsel, and that she was on her own (R. 158 at 128; R. 180 at 123). 
Prior to this conversation with her prior counsel, Respondent was not aware that he 
had even withdrawn as her counsel (R. 158 at | 2 8 ; R. 180 at If 23). 
27. After Respondent's conversation with her prior attorney, Respondent attempted to 
obtain other counsel, however, because of her financially destitute circumstances, 
she was unable to afford the cost of retaining another attorney (R. 180 at f 24). 
28. Respondent did not receive a copy of Petitioner's Motion to Compel until after 
May 11, 2004 when Respondent's prior counsel finally forwarded her a copy (R. 
158 at 1f 30; R. 180 at 125). 
29. In May of 2004 Respondent continued to experience considerable pain from her 
roll-over accident and continued to undergo regular chiropractic therapy (R. 158 at 
If 31; R. 178 at ! 19). 
30. On June 4, 2004 Respondent participated, via telephone, in a Scheduling 
Conference with Petitioner's Counsel and the trial court (R. 75). 
31. After the June hearing, Petitioner and Respondent agreed to a stipulation to resolve 
the divorce proceeding (R. 159 at U 33; R. 180 at Tf 26). 
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32. On July 3, 2004, Respondent received the stipulated agreement purportedly 
containing the agreed to terms of the divorce stipulation (R. 159 at f 34; R. 180 at 
1fl| 26, 27). Respondent signed and notarized the stipulation (R. 159 at ^ 34; R. 180 
at fflf 26, 27). Petitioner admits that he sent Respondent several stipulations (R. 
227at1fl3).1 
33. On about July 8, 2004, Respondent had to undergo a second reconstructive surgery 
in order to adequately and properly repair the hole in her breast (R. 159 at % 35; R. 
180 at f 28). 
34. In early July of 2004, Petitioner told Respondent that the stipulation she had signed 
was invalid unless she took the divorce education class (R. 159 at f^ 36; R. 180 at Tf 
27). Respondent immediately called and signed up for the divorce education class 
at the next available time, which was held approximately August 16, 2004 (R. 159 
a t p 6 ; R . 180 at If 27). 
35. After taking the divorce class, Respondent called Petitioner informing him that she 
had signed the stipulation and had taken the divorce education class (R. 159 at f^ 
37; R. 181 at Tf 29). She then sent the notarized stipulation and divorce education 
certificated to Petitioner's counsel (R. 159at^|37;R. 181 at^29). 
36. Shortly thereafter, Respondent called Petitioner's counsel to see if Petitioner had 
signed the stipulation, however, she was unable to speak with Petitioner's counsel 
1
 Petitioner incorrectly recalls the stipulation period, claiming it occurred 
from June through December of 2003. (See R. 227 at If 13.) However, since Petitioner 
did not even file his Verified Complaint for Divorce until December 18, 2003, the 
stipulation period could not have occurred as claimed by Petitioner. (See R. 1-9.) 
Page 15 of 50 
and was only able to leave a message for him (R. 159 at % 38; R. 181 at f 30). 
Petitioner's counsel never returned Respondent's phone call ®. 181 at <[} 30). 
37. Near the later part of August, Respondent again called Petitioner regarding the 
stipulation (R. 159 at 139; R. 181 at ^ j 31). Petitioner explained that he was only 
waiting to hear from his counsel and then he would sign the stipulation (R. 159 at f^ 
39; R. 181 at 1| 31). 
38. In early September, Respondent once again called Petitioner regarding the status of 
the stipulation (R. 159 at % 40; R. 181 at 132). Again Petitioner told Respondent 
that he was only waiting to get the stipulation from his counsel (R. 159 at f 40; R. 
181 at 132). Petitioner assured Respondent that he would contact his counsel 
regarding the stipulation (R. 159 at 140; R. 181 at f 32). 
39. On or about September 7, 2004, Petitioner purportedly filed a Motion for Default 
and Evidentiary Hearing (R. 83-86). 
40. Petitioner purportedly both filed with the trial court and sent to Respondent a 
Notice to Submit for Decision Petitioner's Motion for Default and Evidentiary 
Hearing on September 17, 2004 (R. 87-89; R. 90-91; R. 160 at f 42). 
41. The Notice of Evidentiary Hearing was purportedly sent by the trial court to 
Respondent on September 17, 2004, only 7 days prior to the Evidentiary Hearing 
(R. 90-91). 
42. Respondent never received a copy of the Motion for Default and Evidentiary 
Hearing, the Notice to Submit or Notice of the Evidentiary Hearing (R. 160 at f 
44;R. 181 atTf33). 
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The Evidentiary Hearing took place on September 24,2004 (R. 92). 
At the Evidentiary Hearing, Petitioner's counsel proffered inaccurate evidence, 
namely (R. 192-195, a copy of this Transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit UG"): 
a. That since December of 2003, Respondent has had breast augmentation 
surgery and received several tattoos, implying that because she had the 
ability to pay for these items she must be making a good living from her 
employment (R. 192; Exhibit "G"). This characterization is inaccurate and 
places Respondent in a false, negative light. As stated above, the primary 
purpose of the surgery was not augmentation, but reconstruction - which 
required two surgeries to complete (R. 161 at Tf 48a; R. 182 at ^ f 37). 
Moreover, despite the need for the reconstructive surgery, the only reason 
she was able to have the surgery is because her mother assisted with the 
financing (R. 161 at 148a; R. 182 at f 37). Additionally, the tattoo she 
received was done without charge by her brother (R. 161 at f 48a; R. 182 at 
137). 
b. Petitioner requested to have Respondent's wage imputed at $9.00 per hour 
(R. 192; Exhibit "G"). This is untrue. As stated previously, at the time of 
the Evidentiary Hearing, she was only making $7.50 per hour working full 
time at Pointe Break Gas Station (R. 161 at f 48b; R. 178 at f 17). 
c. Petitioner claimed that Respondent was working as a bartender (R. 192; 
Exhibit "G"). This is untrue. Respondent has never worked as a bartender 
(R. 161 at 148c; R. 182 at If 38). 
Page 17 of 50 
d. Petitioner represented that Respondent was fired from Wal-Mart because of 
an affair she was having with her boss (R. 192; Exhibit "G"). This is 
untrue. Respondent was wrongfully released from Wal-Mart because she 
reported sexual harassment by a co-worker to management (R. 161 at U 48d; 
R. 177 at f 13). 
e. Petitioner represented that the real property was premarital property (R. 
192; Exhibit "G"). This is untrue. Prior to the parties' marriage, Petitioner 
secured a mortgage on the marital home in the amount of approximately 
$110,000 (R. 161 at 148e). For the 4 Vi years prior to the parties' 
separation, Respondent helped contribute to the approximately $800.00 per 
month mortgage (R. 161 at f^ 48e; R. 176 at f 3). Respondent has an 
interest in the equity she contributed to the marital home during the parties' 
marriage (R. 161 at \ 48e). In Petitioner's affidavit, he does not deny that 
Respondent has an equitable interest in the martial home and does not try to 
explain or reconcile his statement at the Evidentiary Hearing (that the home 
was premarital) with the actuality of the parties' situation (that Respondent 
has an equitable interest in the home). (R. 224-229.) 
On approximately September 26, 2004 Respondent called Petitioner again 
regarding the status of the stipulation (R. 160 at If 46; R. 181 at f 34). This time 
Petitioner openly mocked and laughed at her telling, her that she was "so f ing 
stupid!" and that "I just got everything." (R. 160 at U 46; R. 181 at U 34.) 
Petitioner never denies making these statements to Respondent. (R. 224-229.) 
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After this conversat ion, Responden t realized, for the first t ime, that Peti t ioner had 
purposeful ly deceived Iter, liia: iu ^ . no: ;ntenc. :• n^-uy. trie ^tipuiaiion t::a: the 
. -•-. i •. * - .:- 'i - • f • •, -• v'-I • u :a < •-:' ;! --.far advantage in the 
divorce proceeding th rough deceit and subterfuge (R. 160 at ^ 46 ; il . i h \ ;i r "-;. 
After Respondent's conversation w ith I 'etitioner, she oi ice again be;....'. ».r . >r 
an attorney to represent her in the divorce proceeding (R. 181 at f^ 34). 
46. Respondent hired present counsel on or about September 28, 2004 and 
Respondent N picseni i UUILSCI faxctl and miailuil HI I .. . , " y* . :),i" met , 
counsel a Notice of Appearance of Counsel on September 28, 20;*J (R ^3-94). 
"V, Respondent was completely unaware of the Evidentiary Hearing scheduled on 
taken place (R. 162 at 149; R. 182 at If 3 5). 
48. Respondent IMK>; iegaliv trained or well educated. Respondent admitted:) iailed 
However, Respondent \\:i> unaware that a failure to respond to his Disco\ ery 
Requests could result in a sancti J.« *•; - Default Judgment against her w hen she had 
previously filed an Answer to his Divorce Petition (R. 162 at * 50; R. 182 at f^ 36). 
49. On December 7, 2004, a default Decree of Divorce was ordered h\ the trial court 
as a sanction tc R espondent's failure to comply \ v ith Petitioner's i )isco\ ei > 
Requests (R. 132-140). 
50. On March 4, 2005, Responden t t i m e h iiied a Moii- >n io Set Aside the Decree of 
»v< 4* • ' ' ! ,;": * * - ::-poi t :)f the I Motion tc 
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Set Aside the Decree of Divorce. Attached to the Memorandum was Respondent's 
Affidavit, and several other supporting documents (R. 151-152; R. 153-195). 
51. On April 21, 2005, the Honorable Paul D. Lyman issued a Ruling denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce (R. 247-248). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent's appeal is based upon six errors attributed to the trial court's Ruling 
denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce (hereinafter Respondent's 
"Motion to Set Aside"). 
First, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying Respondent's 
Motion to Set Aside because it was entered without properly complying with due process 
requirements. Pursuant to the Rule 6(d) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Respondent is entitled to five days of effective notice of the Evidentiary Hearing, 
exclusive of weekends and holidays. Respondent's due process rights were violated 
because she only received two days of effective notice of the Evidentiary Hearing. 
Second, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside because it was entered by the trial court without the 
trial court making adequate findings to support its decision. Motions to set aside 
judgments are normally reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard. However, the 
trial court is required to make "adequate" findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
making its decision. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in not making 
sufficient findings because it made no findings whatsoever regarding Respondent's 
claims of mistake and excusable neglect, fraud and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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Third, Respondent argues that the that the trial court: erred in denying 
Respondent's Motion i >.j; -•...• a,- because Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on Respondent's mistake and excusable 
neglect. Motions to set aside judgments are normally reviewed under the "abuse of 
uncontested, of the surrounding circumstances which adequately support her claims of 
mistake and excusable neglect. In denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside under these 
ci rcumstances, the trial coi it It abi lsed its disci etion. 
Fourth, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside because Respondent se; \ovu ->u: ndent grounds to set 
asi.de the default Decree of Dr 01 ce based 01 1 Petitioner's acti :)iis of fraud :>i 
misrepresentation regarding his willingness to enter into a divorce stipulation. Motions to 
set aside judgments are normally review JL a;..;.: '.:u ara.^ ,•: discretion" standard 
However, Respondent submitted credible evidence, that was largely uncontested, of the 
surrounding circumstances which adequately support her claims that Petitioner committed 
- K : u . , . r . I ^ ; H - _•.; , . . . . .
 : . ^ > , / • - ^ • • - * - M -
these circumstances, the trial court abused \t< discretion. 
Fifth, Respondent argues that the thai \\K i:iai court erred in denying Respondent's 
Motion t :) Sel A< iu h > 1 »e ::ai l s e R espondent set forth si iffic ie nt groi iiicis to set aside tl le 
default Decree of )>:\ orce based on of Petitioner's actions of intentional fraud or 
misrepresentation .a:a i.iicntiona; ....-;. vi: closures to ttie •;1al court regarding material 
fact'- •\jle\aiiL ic •'• :". r^  ;^* :i ! •\! •* - : -.: I. • i - .«•-1(r. - . . - " - a -
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reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard. However, Respondent submitted 
credible evidence, that was largely uncontested, of the surrounding circumstances which 
adequately support her claims that Petitioner attempted to perpetrate a fraud upon the trial 
court. In denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside under these circumstances, the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
Finally, Respondent argues that the that the trial court erred in denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside because Respondent set forth sufficient grounds to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce based on her prior counsel's ineffective assistance. 
Motions to set aside judgments are normally reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" 
standard. However, Respondent submitted credible evidence, that was largely 
uncontested, of the surrounding circumstances which adequately support her claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. In denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside under 
these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that all claims of error in Respondent's 
Appellate Brief (hereafter Respondent's "Brief) to the Court of Appeals (hereafter the 
"Court") originate from the trial court's Ruling denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
Aside. As Respondent's Motion to Set Aside was based upon Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, a brief review, demonstrating that all of the threshold 
requirements for each claim in the Rule 60(b) Motion were met, is appropriate. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the granting of relief from 
judgments and orders based on reasons other than that of a clerical mistake. The trial 
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court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under 
Rui. -»:r and i^  reviewer ;::'ici.:'^:. L::-V, ^  .-. a:.,v*: J.:vi:. »::..:..... .VJL ^/'Y/. r\.-.. 
77i i\2d 11 in. 11 . " , I ;aii Cl. App. 1989); see also Franklin Covey Client Sales v. 
Melvin, 2 ?.3d 4'^\. 454 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). Additionally, the scope of the appellate 
only the propriety of denial or grant of relief." Franklin Covey Client Sales, 2 P.3d at 
456. Rule 60(b) states, in its entirety: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance 
of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
u^rp:~iNe.. ;*• excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
I *»::cnc? could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
ivuie 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment 
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or 
(3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was 
entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
I l a I ' v . v . \ . i \ •.••••.: ) . • 
2
 While Respondent recognizes that Rule 60(b) motions are typically 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, because Respondent presents a legal 
question regarding her due process rights, the due process claim is reviewed for 
correctness. See e.g., Pangea Technologies, !m . C)4 P.3-,! at 2^{> 
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There are three additional requirements for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure: "[f]irst that the reason be one other than those listed in 
subdivisions (1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justifies] relief; and third, that the 
motion be made within a reasonable time." Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel Ass 'n, 657 
P.2d 1304, 1306-1307 (Utah 1982). Additionally, Rule 60(b)(6) is not available to one 
who should have filed under Rule 60(b)(1) but did not. See Richins v. Delbert Chipman 
& Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 
(Utah 1984). 
In Respondent's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside, Respondent raised the following 
Rule 60(b) grounds3 to be set aside the Decree of Divorce: subdivision (1), a claim of 
mistake or excusable neglect; subdivision (3), two claims of fraud (one committed upon 
Respondent and one upon the trial court); and subdivision (6), any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgement- in this case a claim of a violation due process 
and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (SeeR. 163-172.)4 
Regarding the timeliness of the Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside, Respondent's has 
satisfied both the three month time limit, for subdivisions (1) and (3), and the reasonable 
time limit, for subdivision (6), because her Motion was timely filed before three months 
3
 All of these grounds were preserved for and raised in this appeal. (See 
Respondent's Notice of Appeal at R. 249-251; see also Respondent's Docketing Statement filed 
with this Court.) 
4
 Respondent's final issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in issuing his 
Ruling denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Judgment without entered sufficient 
findings of facts. This issue was also preserved for and raised in this appeal. See 
Respondent's Notice of Appeal at R. 249-251; see also Respondent's Docketing 
Statement filed with this Court. 
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had elapsed from the trial court's entry of the Decree of Divorce.5 Any specific Rule 
60(b) i equii ements i ele v anttc each indi\ idiial claim oi subdiv ision will be set i 01 th i n the 
body of that claim's argument. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING 
TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE, ON THE BASIS 
THAT RESPONDENT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
BECAUSE SHE DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THE 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
At the outset,, it should be noted that Responden; na^  cieark mei UK iiuk *>0(b) 
threshold inquin T for bringing her due process claim i mder R i ile 60(b) First, 
Respondent's claim of lack of due process is not contemplated under Rule 60(b)(l H:" i. 
and has been recognize.: i, ia; . \ , , - m. ^:IJ:K..; provL>;,»:i u: : ,UCV^!:N/O). •» • u\e 
Matter of Estate ofPeppc:. " i i P.2d 261, 263 (utaii i985:(1 ( Apnelia'v' -•. - .. *?<s 
ground of defective notice was analyzed under Rule 60(b)(6)): sec also Bish s Sheet 
'.'« .. . • . . . ^ ' . . : . . . .:J-S.' pr . : J C ^ o f 
law is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6)). Second, a denial of due process that results 
in an issuance of a default divorce would clearly justify relief from such an order. 
Finall> , Respondent's I \ lotion to Set Aside w as filed w ithin a i easonable tin le as it v < as 
As set forth in the Record on Appeal, the Decree of Divorce was entered on 
December 9, 2004 and Respondent's Motion to Set Aside was entered on March 4, 2005. 
(See R. 132-140 and R. 151-152.) Thus, it is clear that R espondent's Rule 60(b) Motion 
was timely and properly filed. 
5
 I his case was decided under a prior version of Rule 60(b), where 
subdivision (7) provided for relief from judgment for "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment." In the Matter of Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d at 263, 
fii 1. The language of this subdivision is now found under Rule 60(b)(6) of 1 hah Rul-s of 
Civil Procedure. 
7
 1 '1 lis case vv as also decided undei a pi ior version <M : «.<. -< l*\ 
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filed within three months of the entry of Default Judgment. Thus, all of the requirements 
to satisfy a threshold showing for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) were clearly met. 
A. The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error In Failing to Correctly 
Consider Respondent's Lack of Due Process Issue. 
In ruling on Respondent's Motion to Set Aside, specifically, with respect to her 
claim that her due process rights were violated because she did not receive timely notice 
of the Evidentiary Hearing, the trial court made the following statement: 
[t]he primary factual dispute in this matter revolves around whether the 
Respondent was sent notices regarding the [trial court' s] proceedings after the 
[trial court's] June 4, 2004 scheduling conference.. . . She claims that after 
that date she received no notices This claim is not credible The [trial 
court] has reviewed the file and is still of the opinion... that the Respondent 
had adequate notice and chose not to appear and not to have counsel present. 
(R. 247-248; Exhibit "F".) In reviewing the trial court's Ruling, it is apparent that the 
trial court was convinced that Respondent knew about the Evidentiary Hearing and 
simply chose to ignore it. {See R. 247-248; Exhibit "F"). However, regardless of the 
accuracy or veracity of the trial court's conclusion,8 it is also very apparent and plain that 
the trial court's conclusion completely misses the point of Respondent's procedural due 
process argument. The thrust of Respondent's argument and her primary point is that her 
due process rights were violated because the notice of the hearing was not sent out 
properly or pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and not whether she received 
notice of or was aware of the hearing. 
8
 Respondent has submitted a sworn affidavit that she never received a copy 
of the Notice of Evidentiary Hearing sent by the trial court. {See R. 159 at \ 33.) 
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One of the fundamental features oi auc process is that it "requires mat notice he 
259 (quoting Riggins e; a!, v. Dis:. (V;//r; oi Sail Lake County c: JL. 5 ! P.2d 645, 660 
u :ai!
 tv.O' tinier:^, juotes omitted)). 1 'lain 1> , R espondent's argumem uoc: i- innge 
on whether she was present at the previous June 4, 2004 hearing (where no Evidentiary 
Hearing date was set), whether -.lie later actually received the trial court's notice of the 
accompanying memorandum to her Motion to Set Aside, regardless of whether 
Respondent actually received the trial court's notice of the hearing, Respondent's 
1 mo\ v ledge does not affect the du e • ; n < : K "£ >ss ./;///\ ic i :•••;• -h - - \ e'\ o : 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
According to the trial court records, Petit ioner filed with the trial court and sent 
day, the trial court sent, by mail , a Not ice of Evidentiary Hearing to Respondent advising 
her of the Evidentiary Hear ing scheduled \^\ September _4. JU(-4. (bet i-. '••'•; 
6 >f1 he I JtahR i lies* )f Civil Prr **'• - >.AM- >o tU - •• " i •- *.-i:.-
specifically sets forth the m i n i m u m period oi notice required to effect proper not ice: 
-Notice vi a iicdiuij; snail be served not uuer man j a ays before ine u.ue 
specified fnnh.~ hearing, unless a different perkx3 i< fiv.;V hy t h e s e m \ r < . « !v. 
9
 Respondent adamantly maintains that she never received either Pe t i t ioner ' s 
Notice to Submit or the trial c o n n ' s Notice of Evidentiary Hearing. (See R. 160 at % 44.) 
Again, regardless of whether Respondent actually received the Notices, the Not ices 
violate the fundamental principles of due process because she did not receive adequate 
notice pursuant t" *bc i f*nh Rv\r< of OVi] Procedure and established case law. 
P . ii r o ' ) 7 , ,f Z( i 
order of the court. Such an order may for cause be made on ex parte 
application. 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other 
paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days 
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under section 
(a) [i.e., where the prescribed period of time is less than 11 days, exclusive of 
the mailing period, intermediate weekends and legal holidays are excluded 
from the computation].... 
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(d), (e) (emphasis added). Thus, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
plainly require five days of actual notice of the hearing, exclusive of weekends, holidays 
and the three day mailing period.10 In this case, in order for the notice to be procedurally 
adequate, the Notice of the Evidentiary Hearing would have had to have been sent by 
mail no later than September 14,2004, three days earlier than the September 17, 2004 
mailing or the Evidentiary Hearing would have had to have been held no sooner than 
September 27,2004.11 
Moreover, this minimum five day period of effective notice as required by due 
process has also been confirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. In Mickelson v. Shelley, the 
Utah Supreme Court held, that despite numerous pretrial reschedulings, that despite 
defendant's failure to timely appoint counsel, that despite defendant's failure to appear at 
the hearing and that despite notice of the hearing being mailed eight days prior to the 
10
 For a discussion regarding whether the trial court "fixed" a different notice 
period for the Evidentiary Hearing, see infra, Part IB. 
11
 The Notice of Evidentiary Hearing was purportedly mailed out on 
September 17, 2004 (see R. 90-91), September 18th and 19th were weekend days and 
excluded from the five-day notice period. Once the three mailing days are also excluded, 
it is clear that only two days of effective notice were given to Respondent for the 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
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hearing, defendant's notice was procedurally deiec:>\ c. and therefore VA\ ;:\ui court erred 
in failing to set aside judgment on this groi to :1 "" ' ' ' y " ' ~ -~ ' "• -.t '<•'"'' 
Accordingly, the case was remanded for a new hearing. Mickelson, 542 P.2d at 742.. 
I he Court reasoned a.-loiiows: 
Our Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when notice is required and is given 
h\ mailing, three extra days must be included in the required time. If we 
deduct the three days from the eight actually given, we have only a five-day 
notice, and when the time is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, 
Sundays and holidays must be excluded. One Saturday and one Sunday 
intervened . . . and so effective notice to [the defendant] was on the order of 
three days, which seems a bit short in view of the fact that Rule 6(d), U.R.C.P., 
provides for five days' notice of hearing on a written motion. While the notice 
of trial was not on a written motion, it is indicative of what reasonable time for 
a notice of a trial date might be. 
Mickelson, 542 P.2d rt "M2 -emphasis added) ' * v -iuvr " :•- ! "inh Rules ~r' ^ r 
Procedure, Rule 6(d) now specifically requiresfive days notice of all hewing, exclusive 
i;i.,-additional mailing days, weekends a;K-; i-:;i;.;io, . ..:-.. p:e>en! case. ;: <:;. i;.;*ee 
mailing days are deducted from the seven days of notice given, of the four remaining days 
of notice, two of the days are weekend days.13 According to the holding in Mickelson and 
12
 It should be noted that, while the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been 
amended since this case ruling, the five day notice requirement for hearings has not been 
removed. Significantly, the current version of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is still in 
conformity with Mickelson regarding the computation of the three day mailing period. 
Like Mickelson, Rule 6(a) currently calculates weekends and holidays that fall during the 
mailing period as part of the three day mailing period. See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). The only 
exception to this Rule is if the final mailing day (and thus the filing or notice deadline) 
falls upon a weekend or holiday, the next work day becomes the filing or notice deadline. 
Seel JtahR Civ. P 6(a) 
13
 The Notice of Evidentiary Hearing was purportedlv mailed out on 
September 17, 2004 (sec R. 90-91), September i 8th and I°lh were weekend days and 
excluded from the five-day notice period. (-Mice &c three mailing days are also excluded, 
it is clear that only two days of effective notice were given to Respondent for the 
Evidentiary Hear in J? . 
"Dot TO on , vf ^n 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent's effective notice period (regardless of 
whether she actually received said notice) is equivalent to only two days, which is 
insufficient when procedural due process requires at least a five day period of effective 
notice. Because Respondent did not have adequate notice or opportunity to participate in 
the Evidentiary Hearing, her due process rights have been violated. In light of such 
blatant procedural defects, the trial court's failure to set aside the default Decree of 
Divorce clearly constitutes reversible error under the "correctness" standard.14 
B. The Trial Court Did Not "Fix" a Lesser Notice Period for the 
September 24, 2004 Evidentiary Hearing. 
In Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition (hereafter "Petitioner's Summary 
Disposition Memorandum"15), filed with this Court, Petitioner argues that the trial court's 
failure to consider her due process arguments does not constitute "manifest error"16 for 
two reasons: (1) that the trial court "fixed" a lesser notice period for the hearing; and (2) 
14
 Respondent recognizes that procedural questions are typically reviewed by 
the Court under the non-deferential "correctness" standard, nevertheless, Respondent 
maintains that the trial court's error was so blatant and so grievous as to constitute 
reversible error under even the more deferential "abuse of discretion" standard the Court 
typically utilizes to review a trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside. 
15
 For the Court's convenience, a copy of Petitioner's Summary Disposition 
Memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit "H". 
16
 "Manifest error" is the standard set forth by Rule 10(a)(2)(B) of the Utah 
Rules Appellate Procedure in order to grant a Motion for Summary Disposition. See Utah 
R. App. P. 10(a)(2)(B). The Utah Supreme Court has described "manifest error" as error 
that is "obvious." See State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 1992); see also TMD, 
Inc. v. Tax Com 'n, 103 P.3d 190, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). In any event, it is 
Respondent's contention that the trial court's violation of Respondent's due process rights 
constitutes reversible error under either an "manifest error" or "correctness" standard. 
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that even if the trial court erred, the error was not manifest error because it was 
ha rmless 1? Even with a ci ixsory review of Petitioner's arguments ih it is apparei it that 
Petitioner's arguments misconceive basic procedural requirements, are unfounded and 
without suppon .. .a.. : .. o 
Sec Lxhihit "IT". r»i>. !-.7. 
'*:.- ci gcnciuii/o k^poiiuciit's arguiiiciii as claiming that the in.u 
court iaiku ir .\ :. _cr her arguments regarding due process. (See Exhibit "H", p " : 
Petitioner's generalization overly-simplifies Respondent's argument. Respondent 
concedes that the trial court "considered" her argument (although Respondent openly 
questions how much "consideration" Respondent's arguments received, as the trial court 
ruled on the Motion to Set Aside without giving Respondent an opportunity of oral 
argument and without even addressing several arguments raised by Respondent, such as 
excusable neglect, fraud and ineffective assistance of counsel), however, Respondent's 
primary dispute regarding her due process claim is, despite case law and procedural law 
explicitly requiring five days of effective notice for any hearing, and despite the record 
clearly demonstrating that Respondent did not receive the requisite five days of effective 
notice, the trial court refused to set aside the judgment, and gave short shrift to her 
arguments (and also mis-characterized her arguments by making it a question of 'whether 
the notice was sent instead of when the notice was sent) by concluding that Respondent 
had received adequate notice of the Evidentiary Hearing. (See Respondent*:-
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition pp ' 0-1 fr see also R, 247-
: i S : ! : v h i b i i f c ^ ' i 
19
 In Petitioner's Summary Disposition Memorandum, he also requests that 
the Court strike the transcript (included with Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Disposition, Motion to Set Aside and herein as Exhibit "G") on the grounds that it was 
not prepared by a licensed transcriber. (See Exhibit UH", p. 3.) With respect to 
Petitioner's request to strike the transcript, while Respondent concedes the transcript was 
not prepared by a licensed transcriber, Petitioner's request to strike the transcript is not 
well founded because Petitioner has not alleged any basis to suggest that the transcript 
contains errors or is somehow inaccurate. Moreover, a verbatim copy of the transcript 
was included with Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and Petitioner, in his original 
response, did not object to the accuracy of the transcript nor did he ask the trial court to 
strike the transcript at that time. (See R. 191-195; R. 219-223.) Because Petitioner did 
not object to the introduction of the transcript at the trial court level, he is not now 
allowed to move to strike the transcript for the first time on appeal. See e.g. D & L 
Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (A party's failure to object to the 
evidentiary sufficiency of an affidavit results in the party waiving the right to object to the 
admitted evidence on appeal). Finally, the admi^ihilib -^the transcript does no* afArt 
P-:UTP. 'VI 
Petitioner's primary argument regarding Respondent's due process claim is that 
because the trial court denied Respondent's Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside, that ipso facto 
the trial court "clearly fixed a shorter time for the Hearing." (Petitioner's Summary 
Disposition Memorandum, p. 2.) As support of this argument, Petitioner references the 
language Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,20 which states, in its entirety, 
"[njotice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days before the time specified for 
the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such 
an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(d). 
However, Petitioner's argument is completely without merit. Petitioner would 
have this Court believe that, somehow, the trial court's denial of Respondent's 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside, which occurred after the Evidentiary Hearing took place, can 
resolve any of the prior procedural deficiencies regarding that Evidentiary Hearing, 
through the flawed logical conclusion that because the trial court did not correct the error 
when given an opportunity to do so, the trial court must not have committed an error. 
Indeed, such a flawed conclusion would completely eviscerate the procedural protection 
of the notice requirement by allowing any notice problems to be "resolved" by the court 
after the hearing. 
Moreover, Petitioner's argument is also contrary to established case law. 
Petitioner has conveniently failed to consider the Utah Supreme Court ruling in 
Respondent's arguments regarding lack of due process. 
20
 It is assumed that Petitioner meant to reference Rule 6(d), even though his 
Memorandum references Rule 69(d). {See Exhibit "H", p. 2.) 
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.*.UL. ^ ' r wiurem:_ ; ;_m supreme Court: reversed L tnai e<^r; > reima: u ^.: a^ .UL a 
judgment because the hearing notice was inadequate.22 542 P.2d at 741-742. Nowher-c T. 
the Utah Supreme Court's opin ion does it state, that since the trial court, refused TO set 
a side a judgment from a heai i ng sent & ithoutpi opei notice, the trial com t must ha v e 
"fixed" a shorter time period. Id. in fact, the opposite is true, while the Court 
sympatliized with the trial court's frustration in resolving the action, it held that, despite 
numerous pretrial reschedul ings, defendant's faih it e to timeb j appoi lit counsel, 
defendant's failure to appear at the hearing and notice of the hearing being mailed eight 
dayspnoi iu tnc n, .;/*./.\sr, ttiat defendant's notice was procedurally defective, and that 
M-—thro *l ;- •-;•' —* ~- * •: *; '•</* •• * jtnlfinienl (in lliis ground / " 
More telling of the weakness of Petitioner's position is that he has not even 
;L^i:ip^\.; ,,> a^;m.:u;-i. \jicKtist)ii iroiv, me present case. The reason io: mis is. m 
course, quite obvious: while some of the background circumstances differ betwe -?• 
parties, the primary and controlling issue-that of proper procedural notice-is identical. 
1 \\wMickelsun. I'ispoiulcnl sunpls JiJ iuil icct'ive piopci )i aJ(,quatc notice oi the 
Evidentiary Hearing. As such, the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to set 
aside the divorce. 
Ihiialh lVli1inni,T\ juTiiiiirnl fails because il does im! HMHIIIonn \»uth (he specific 
requirements of Rule 6(d). While the trial court can order a different period than set forth 
21
 Forth further discussion regcirci;:i'T'\//./(A : •' a' 
case, sec supra. Par: ! \ 
22
 ...... ease was remanded to the trial court with directions to set aside the 
judgment, sei a. r :n da^ for trial and give proper notice of the trial date. Mickchon* 542 
P.2dat742. 
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in the Rule 6(d), it must actually and officially make such an order prior to the hearing. 
Clearly, the trial court cannot order a different notice period ex post facto ,23 However, a 
review of a record clearly demonstrates that the trial court made no such order, either 
upon motion of Petitioner or sua sponte. It is obvious that the issue was not raised and a 
different time period was not ordered by the trial court prior sending out notice of the 
Evidentiary Hearing. Because the trial court did not order a different notice period, the 
Rule 6(d) notice period of five days (plus three days for mailing) for a hearing needed to 
be complied with strictly. Because it was not, Respondent's due process rights were 
violated. 
C. The Trial Court Error In Failing to Adequately Consider Respondent 
Due Process Argument Was Not Harmless. 
Petitioner then argues, that even if the trial court erred in failing to adequately 
consider Respondent's due process argument, the error was harmless because the 
Respondent was not entitled to a hearing at all. In support of his argument, Petitioner 
states that Petitioner was granted a default decree of divorce pursuant to Rule 104 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule states: 
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing in 
cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after 
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to the 
withdrawal of an answer, or stipulated to the entry of a decree of divorce or 
entry of default. An affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the 
application. The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to support 
necessary findings of fact and a final judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 104. Once again, Petitioner's argument is flawed. A review of the 
23
 To allow otherwise would render the procedural notice period completely 
meaningless, as the trial court could simply resolve any notice issues after the fact. 
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pleadings in this case conclusively demonstrates that none of the above-listed bases were 
present because: (1) Respondent appeared and filed an answer before the Petitioner filed 
for a default decreed of divorce;24 (2) Respondent has never waived notice; and (3) 
Respondent never stipulated to the withdrawal of her answer or to an entry of a decree of 
divorce or entry of default. Accordingly, Rule 104 is completely inapplicable to the 
present case. 
Moreover, Petitioner has somehow forgotten (even though he filed the pleading), 
that the default decree of divorce in this case was granted, at Petitioner's request, as a 
sanction for Respondent's failure to timely respond to Petitioner's discovery requests, and 
not pursuant to Rule 104 or for her failure to make an initial appearance. In fact, 
Petitioner filed the Motion for Default on the same pleading as his request for an 
Evidentiary Hearing. Petitioner was not granted his default decree of divorce until the 
Evidentiary Hearing was held. Therefore, because the default decree of divorce was 
granted on Petitioner's motion as a court-ordered sanction, a hearing, once scheduled by 
the trial court, was required to be noticed properly. As such, the trial court's failure to 
provide adequate notice was not harmless error, but instead constitutes reversible error. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS 
TO SUPPORT ITS DECISION 
In addition to ignoring Respondent's procedural due process claim, the trial court 
abused its discretion and committed reversible error in ruling on Respondent's Motion to 
24
 While the trial court did grant a default judgement as a court-ordered 
discovery sanction, the trial court never ordered that Respondent's Answer be stricken in 
this matter. (See R. 82; R. 132-140.) 
P f l c r p ^ o f SO 
Set Aside, without making adequate finding of fact to support its Ruling. Generally, a 
trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside judgment will only be reversed if 
the trial court abused its discretion. See Fisher, 104 P.3d at 1200. However, in making 
its determination, a trial court's discretionary ruling must be "'based on adequate findings 
of fact' and 'on the law.'" Lund, 11 P.3d at 279 (quoting May, 677 P.2d at 1110). The 
trial court's failure to base its determination on adequate findings of fact or on the law 
constitutes a reversible abuse of its discretion. See May, 667 P.2d at 1110. 
While the trial court is not obligated to set forth overly-detailed findings of fact hi 
its Ruling (see May, 667 P.2d at 1110), in this case, the trial court has provided virtually 
no findings of fact to support its determination. The trial court's sparse findings of facts 
consists of only two brief paragraphs and are set out herein, in their entirety: 
The primary factual dispute in this matter revolves around whether the 
Respondent was sent notices regarding the [trial] [c]ourt's proceedings after 
the [trial] [c]ourt's June 4, 2004 scheduling conference. There is no dispute 
that the Respondent appeared by telephone at that hearing and that she had no 
counsel. She claims that after that date she received no notices, even though 
they were all addressed as they were prior to the scheduling conference. This 
claim is not credible. She also claims that the parties settled the case after the 
scheduling conference. If the case were really settled, why didn't she simply 
appear at the evidentiary hearing with the signed stipulation? 
The [trial] [c]ourt has reviewed the file and is still of the opinion, as originally 
expressed in its December 7, 2004 Ruling on Respondent's Objection to 
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusion of Law and Decree of 
Divorce, that the Respondent had adequate notice and chose not to appear and 
not to have counsel present. 
(R. 247-248; Exhibit "F".) Thus, the trial court's Ruling provides only some very limited 
findings of fact related to Respondent's notice of the proceedings, her claim relating to 
the parties' settlement and her opportunity to appear or have counsel present at the 
Page 36 of 50 
Evidentiary Hearing.25 (See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F".) However, none of these 
findings adequately (or even remotely) address the issues raised by Respondent relating to 
her claims of mistake or excusable neglect, Petitioner's fraud against Respondent, 
Petitioner's fraud upon the trial court or her prior counsel's ineffective assistance. See 
e.g., Lund, 11 P.3d at 279; May, 677 P.2d at 1110; {see also R. 166-172.) Instead, the 
trial court is disturbingly silent regarding these issues raised by Respondent. (See R. 247-
248; see also Exhibit "F".) 
The trial court's sparse findings of fact in its Ruling leaves this Court (and 
Respondent) without an adequate basis to determine the adequacy and propriety of its 
Ruling in light of all the grounds that Respondent raised to set aside the default Decree of 
Divorce. This Court cannot adequately determine if the trial court's findings support its 
denial of all grounds raised by Respondent when absolutely no findings are made with 
respect to those grounds. Accordingly, because the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings of fact to support its Ruling, it has committed an abuse of discretion.26 
25
 For a discussion regarding Respondent's procedural due process claim and 
the trial court's inadequate consideration of said claim, see supra, Part IA-IC. 
26
 Respondent recognizes that, because of the lack of findings in the trial 
court's Ruling, one option the Court has is to simply remand this case for further findings 
on the issues raised by Respondent in her Motion to Set Aside. However, Respondent 
believes that such a step is unnecessary because issuing further findings will not resolve 
the procedural due process violations asserted by Respondent. As such, Respondent 
believes that the most appropriate and efficient action is to reverse the trial court's ruling 
denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside and order a new hearing on Respondent's 
Motion, or in the alternative, because the due process issue asserted in Respondent's 
Motion to Set Aside has no disputed facts and is a legal issue (see infra, Part I), the Court 
could simply vacate the trial court's Ruling and grant Respondent's Motion to Set Aside. 
See e.g., Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg & Loan Assn., 94 Ut 97, 124, 75 P.2d 
669 (1938) (Where the questions presented were purely legal and no fact questions 
remained in issues, there was no purpose in remanding the case for retrial). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE BASED ON RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT OF MISTAKE AND 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
At the outset, it should be noted that for Respondent to be relieved from a 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) she must "demonstrate not only that the judgment resulted 
from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, but also that the motion to set 
aside was timely, and that there exist issues worthy of adjudication." Richins, 817 P.2d at 
386 (Cf. State By & Through Utah State Dep 't of Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 
1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Parker 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994).27 As stated above, Respondent's Motion was timely filed and there exist "issues 
worthy of adjudication."28 Accordingly, the threshold showing for relief under Rule 60(b) 
was met with respect to her claim of mistake and excusable neglect. 
27
 The requirement of "issues worthy of adjudication" seems also to be 
described at times as a demonstration of a "meritorious defense." See e.g. Lund, 11 P.3d 
at 283. In order to meet this standard, Respondent need not actually prove her defense, 
instead, because the policy is to prevent the "necessity of treating defenses that are 
frivolous their face," Respondent is only required to demonstrate through the evidence, 
that if her defense were proven, it "would preclude total or partial recovery by 
[Petitioner]...." Id. In this case, as the default entry was a result of sanction for failure 
to produce discovery requests, Respondent has already answered Petitioner's Divorce 
Complaint, and if the defenses asserted in her Answer were proven, it would deny 
Petitioner much of the relief he requested (and was later granted by the discovery 
sanction) in his Divorce Complaint. {See R. 36-39.) As such, if necessary, Respondent 
has also demonstrated that she has a "meritorious defense" to the Divorce Complaint. 
28
 Although a default judgment was entered in this matter, this divorce action 
was a contested proceeding. Respondent filed an answer contesting and denying many of 
the allegations set forth in Petitioner's Divorce Petition. Respondent contested 
Petitioner's position on many key issues with regard to the resolution of the parties' 
divorce action. Some of these vital and contested issues include: custody and child-
related issues, alimony, division of the parties' personal and marital assets and division of 
real property. These issues are almost uniformly addressed in normal divorce 
proceedings and qualify as "issues worthy of adjudication." 
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When all of the background information and circumstances, that were provided in 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside29 are reviewed, the trial court abused its discretion and 
committed reversible error in failing to grant her Motion based on her argument of 
mistake and excusable neglect.30 In Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of his Motion 
to Compel, Petitioner correctly states that Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
allows the trial court to administer sanctions, including a default judgment, against the 
party who fails to comply with Discovery Requests. (See R. 45-47; Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(C), (d).)31 However, what Petitioner fails to point out is that, although rendering 
a default judgment is an option within the sound discretion of the trial court, nevertheless, 
ordering a "default judgment is an unusually harsh sanction and should be meted out with 
caution." Darrington v. Wade 812 P.2d 452, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). 
The trial court's discretion should be "exercised in furtherance of justice and should 
incline towards granting relief m a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a 
hearing." Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) (citing Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co. et al, 123 Utah 416, 418, 260 P.2d 741 (1953) (emphasis added)). 
29
 See R. 153-162; see also Statement of Facts to Respondent's Brief. 
30
 It should be noted that the trial court made no findings whatsoever 
regarding Respondent's argument that the Decree of Divorce should be Set Aside on the 
grounds of mistake or excusable neglect. See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F". For 
further discussion regarding the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact, see 
supra, Part II. 
31
 While Respondent concedes that a default judgment was entered pursuant to 
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as a sanction for her failure to respond to 
Petitioner's discovery requests, Respondent maintains that his type of entry of default is 
not pursuant to Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and cannot be entered 
without a hearing. For further discussion see supra, Part IC. 
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated its position with respect to 
the propriety of setting aside a default judgment on the grounds of a reasonable 
justification or excuse, stating, "it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside." 
Helgesen, 636 P.2d at 1081 (quoting Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 
54, 376 P.2d 951 (1962)); see also Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1977). 
In this case, Respondent's mistake and neglect are excusable and reasonably 
justifiable when the surrounding circumstances prior to and leading up to the default 
judgment are fully disclosed32 and the trial court abused its discretion in not setting aside 
the Decree of Divorce upon Respondent's Motion.33 
In support of her Motion to Set Aside the Decree of Divorce on the grounds of 
mistake or excusable neglect, the Respondent set forth several viable grounds (all of 
32
 See supra pp. 7-20; see also, R. 175-183. 
33
 Interestingly, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent 
Motion to Set Aside (Petitioner's "Memorandum in Opposition") does not even address 
the majority of the issues raised or arguments presented by Respondent. {See R. 219-
223.) Instead, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition focuses solely on Petitioner's 
argument that Respondent could not bring a motion to set aside because it is barred by the 
doctrine of the "law of the case." {SeeR. 219-223.) As throughly explained in 
Respondent's Reply Memorandum, the doctrine of the "law of the case" is inapplicable in 
this case and Respondent was fully authorized, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in filing her Motion to Set Aside. {See R. 236-243.) Why the trial court did 
not grant Respondent's largely unopposed Motion to Set Aside (or even allow a hearing 
on the matter), especially when Respondent's argument of a procedural due process 
violation was completely uncontested and unopposed, is a complete mystery to 
Respondent (the opposition to Respondent's Motion was limited to Petitioner's argument 
of the doctrine of the "law of the case" and two affidavits that did not even address all the 
issues raised or arguments set forth by Respondent {see R. 219-223; R. 224-230; R. 231-
233). 
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which were either ignored or simply unaddressed by the trial court in its Ruling ). First, 
Respondent was experiencing, and continues to experience, difficulties because of her 
physical circumstances. Shortly before she was served with the Discovery Requests, she 
was involved in a horrible roll-over car crash, causing serious injuries to her left side, hip, 
leg and neck. These injuries required her to undergo protracted physical therapy.35 She 
was required to undergo extensive chiropractic therapy for several months and is still 
being regularly treated by the chiropractor. During this same time period, she also had 
two reconstructive surgeries.36 Right after the accident and the first surgery, Petitioner 
served Respondent with his Discovery Requests. The timing of the requests was 
extremely inopportune, and she was required to deal with the difficulties inherent in 
complying with a discovery demand, while simultaneously devoting a considerable 
amount of time to her recovery from her accident and surgeries. Moreover, her prior 
counsel's refusal to respond to her phone calls or requests for help made an already 
difficult and stressful situation for Respondent seemingly insurmountable.37 
Second, Respondent has adamantly maintained and has provided a sworn 
statement that she was unaware of the Motion for Default Judgment and Evidentiary 
34
 See Ruling at R. 247-248. 
35
 Petitioner never disputes or opposes the nature of Respondent's car accident 
or the severity of her injuries sustained therein. (See R. 224-229.) 
36
 Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent was obligated to remove a lump 
from her breast, but disagrees that the reconstructive surgery was necessary because he 
characterizes the lump as "small." (See R. 227 at ^ 12.) 
37
 For a discussion as to whether Respondent's prior counsel's actions amount 
to inadequate representation, see infra Part V. 
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Hearing until her present counsel informed her that the Evidentiary Hearing had already 
taken place.38 Respondent had numerous conversations with Petitioner prior to the 
hearing and he never once mentioned the upcoming Evidentiary Hearing.39 
Third, although Respondent should have obtained another counsel sooner, after her 
prior counsel unexpectedly terminated his representation (while a discovery request was 
still pending), she could not afford to pay retainer for another attorney at the time. 
Moreover, Respondent's financially destitute circumstances were exacerbated by 
Petitioner's wrongful seizure of almost all of the parties' assets.40 
Finally, the parties had already agreed to the terms of the stipulation and she had 
even returned to Petitioner a notarized, signed copy of the stipulation. Respondent made 
numerous efforts to contact Petitioner in order to finalize the stipulation. Every time 
Respondent contacted Petioner about the status of the stipulation, Petitioner simply told 
Respondent he only needed to contact his attorney and sign the stipulation.41 Prior to the 
Default and Evidentiary Hearing, Petitioner never informed Respondent that he no longer 
intended to abide by the terms of the agreed upon stipulation.42 
38
 SeeR. 160 at 144; R. 162 at f 49; R. 181 at 133; R. 182 at % 35 
39
 For a discussion as to whether Petitioner's actions amount to fraud, see 
infra Fart TV. 
40
 Petitioner admits that he took all of the funds from the parties' accounts 
after the parties' separation. (See R. 226 at TJ 7.) 
41
 Despite the trial court's skepticism regarding Respondent's assertion that 
the parties' had entered into a stipulation (see R. 247-248), Petitioner admits the parties 
had entertained several stipulations in this matter. (See R. 227 at Tf 13.) 
42
 See R. 181 at f 34. 
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In any event, Respondent is not legally trained or well educated and was simply 
unaware that a failure to respond to Petitioner's Discovery Requests could or would result 
in a sanction of Default Judgment against her. 
While it is true that Respondent could have been more diligent during this 
proceeding, she was experiencing severe, extenuating circumstances, financial 
difficulties, communication and representation problems with prior counsel and a failed 
stipulation. These circumstances were largely uncontested by Petitioner and provide a 
reasonable justification and excuse for her failure to timely respond to the discovery 
demands or to the Default and Evidentiary Hearing. Accordingly, Respondent's Motion 
should be granted. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE BASED ON RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT 
PETITIONER COMMITTED FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION 
AGAINST HER OR THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court defined fraud as "a false representation of an existing 
material fact, made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, 
upon which plaintiff reasonably relies to his detriment." Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.3d 
876, 882 (Utah 2001). Accordingly, in Utah, the elements of fraud are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) 
which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge on which to base 
such a representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to 
his injury and damage. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); see also Maynardv. Wliarton, 912 
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P.2d 446, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the course of obtaining a default Decree of 
Divorce against the Respondent, Petitioner appears to have committed fraud, not only 
upon Respondent, but also upon the Court at the Evidentiary Hearing.43 Respondent 
submitted credible evidence of that Petitioner had committed fraud with her and upon the 
trial court.44 
A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion when it Failed to Set Aside the 
Decree of Divorce When Respondent Submitted Credible Evidence that 
Petitioner Deliberately Made Fraudulent and False Representations to 
Respondent Regarding His Willingness to Enter into a Divorce 
Stipulation in Order to Obtain a Default Judgment. 
As detailed in the Statement of Facts included in Respondent's Memorandum in 
Support of her Motion to Set Aside (see R. 7,133 - R. 8,146),45 shortly after the June 
43
 It should be noted that the trial court made no findings regarding 
Respondent's Argument that the Decree of Divorce should be set aside on the grounds of 
fraud or misrepresentation. See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F". For further discussion 
regarding the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact, see supra, Part II. 
The trial court's sole finding that might be considered related to her fraud claims is that 
the Court found it not credible to believe that Respondent, if she had a valid stipulation, 
would not simply attend the Evidentiary Hearing and submit the stipulation at that time. 
See R. 247-248. 
44
 Much of Respondent's claims regarding fraud were not even controverted 
by Petitioner in his response to Respondent's Motion to Set Aside. Indeed, Petitioner's 
response does not even address these claims (or the facts asserted by Respondent) and 
Petitioner's supporting affidavit agreed to some of the allegations, and failed to even deny 
several other. See R. 226 at fflf 7, 8; R. 227 at ffl[ 12, 13. Significantly, Petitioner's 
affidavit does not even deny or attempt to clarify Respondent's assertion that the parties' 
home is martial property and that she has an equitable interest in it. See R. 224-229. 
Petitioner also does not deny that after the Evidentiary Hearing, he openly mocked and 
laughed at Respondent, telling her that she was "so f ing stupid!" and that he "just 
got everything." See R. 224-229. 
45
 See also Statement of Facts in this Brief. 
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2004 hearing, Petitioner and Respondent agreed to amicably settle the divorce issues. 
Respondent believed and reasonably relied on Petitioner's representations that he wanted 
to enter into a stipulation. Settlement terms were agreed upon and a stipulation was 
prepared by Petitioner's attorney who then sent a copy to Respondent to sign. Petitioner 
informed Respondent that before the parties could enter into the stipulation, Respondent 
was required to attend the Divorce Education Class. After Respondent took the Divorce 
Education Class on August 14, 2004, Respondent immediately sent the signed, notarized 
copy of the stipulation to Petitioner counsel. Respondent believed that Petitioner would 
sign the agreed upon stipulation. Respondent called Petitioner regarding the stipulation 
and each time Petitioner assured her that he intended to sign the stipulation upon receipt 
from his counsel. Petitioner still had not sent Respondent a signed copy of the stipulation 
by September 26, 2004, so Respondent called Petitioner again regarding the status of the 
stipulation. This time Petitioner openly mocked and laughed at Respondent, telling her 
that she was "so f ing stupid!" and that he "just got everything."47 After this 
conversation, Respondent realized, for the first time, that Petitioner had purposefully 
deceived her, that he did not intend to honor the stipulation that the parties had agreed to, 
and had obtained an unfair advantage in the divorce proceeding through deceit and 
subterfuge. After Respondent's conversation with Petitioner, she immediately obtained 
another attorney to represent her. 
46
 Despite the trial court's incredulity regarding Respondent's assertion that 
the parties' had entered into a stipulation (see R. 247-248), Petitioner admits the parties 
had entertained several stipulations in this matter. (See R. 227 at If 13.) 
47
 Petitioner does not deny that this conversation took place or that he made 
the above statements to Respondent. (See R. 224-229.) 
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In retrospect, it is evident that Petitioner simply engaged in inappropriate stall 
tactics and feigned interest in settlement in order to obtain a default judgment against the 
Respondent. Obtaining a default judgment against Respondent, while simultaneously 
feigning interest in settlement in order to make the Respondent more cooperative and 
complacent, surely qualifies as dishonest, fraudulent and improper behavior by Petitioner. 
Petitioner, through deceit and subterfuge, misled Respondent with promises to sign 
the agreed-upon stipulation until after a default judgment had been entered and an 
Evidentiary Hearing held without Respondent's participation. He should not be allowed 
to reap the benefit of his intentional, fraudulent and improper acts. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion when it Failed to Set Aside the 
Decree of Divorce When Respondent Submitted Credible Evidence that 
Petitioner Deliberately Made Fraudulent Representations to the Court 
Regarding the Marital Home and Failed to Disclose That the Parties 
Had Agreed to a Divorce Stipulation. 
Respondent discovered, after a review of the Decree of Divorce, the Evidentiary 
Hearing and the Evidentiary Hearing transcript,48 that Petitioner intentionally mislead the 
the trial court with respect to Respondent's equitable interest in the parties' marital home. 
Petitioner informed the trial court that the home was premarital property. In reasonable 
reliance on Petitioner's statement, the trial court awarded Petitioner sole ownership of the 
marital home. Such a representation is inaccurate and made deliberately with the intent to 
mislead the trial court. Petitioner was fully aware at the time he made the statement to the 
trial court that it was inaccurate and that a mortgage upon the parties' home in the amount 
of approximately $110,000 was secured shortly before the parties were married. As a 
48
 See R. 192-195; see also Exhibit "G". 
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stay-at-home mother during the parties' 4 Vi year marriage, Respondent helped contribute 
to the approximately $800.00 per month mortgage obligation.49 As such, Respondent has 
been harmed in the amount of her equitable interest in the equity of the marital home that 
accrued during the parties' marriage. 
More insidious and deceitful on the part of Petitioner perhaps, is his complete and 
utter failure to discuss with or even mention to the trial court that the parties had reached 
a stipulated agreement with respect to the terms of the divorce and the property 
distribution. Petitioner had not only verbally agreed to terms of the stipulation, but had 
had his attorney draft a stipulation for the parties to sign. Respondent signed this 
stipulation in the presence of a notary and returned it to Petitioner's counsel in the good 
faith expectation that Petitioner would sign the stipulation and the parties' divorce would 
be concluded. For Petitioner to knowingly misinform the trial court regarding the status 
of the parties' home and to fail to disclose to the trial court the parties' stipulation, is a 
deliberate attempt by Petitioner to perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court. The trial 
court's failure to set aside the Decree of Divorce on this ground when raised by the 
Respondent (and not controverted by Petitioner50) constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
49
 Despite his assertions to the trial court at the Evidentiary Hearing that the 
home was premarital property, Petitioner does not deny or attempt to explain in his 
affidavit why Respondent is incorrect regarding her assertions that the home is marital 
property and that she is entitled to an equitable interest in the home. {See R. 224-229.) 
50
 See R. 224-229. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF 
DIVORCE BASED ON RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT OF 
RESPONDENT'S PRIOR COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
As stated in previously, there are three requirements to obtaining relief under Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[fjirst that the reason be one other than 
those listed in subdivisions (1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justifies] relief; and 
third, that the motion be made within a reasonable time." Laub, 657 P.2d at 1306-07. 
This reason is not one contemplated by Rule 60(b)(l)-(5), and Respondent's Motion to 
Set Aside was timely filed. Rule 60(b)(6) is "sufficiently broad" enough to permit a court 
to set aside a judgment on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Re Interest of 
AG., 27 P.3d 562, 564 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (citing Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74, 76 
(Utah 1973)). Ineffective assistance of counsel is established by showing "counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient and that counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced the case." Id. at 565 (citing State in Interest ofE.H. v. A.H., 880 P.2d 11,13 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)).51 
In this case it seems hardly debatable that Respondent's prior counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient and that his performance prejudiced her case. 
Respondent's prior counsel's performance was objectively deficient and harmed the 
Respondent because he refused to assist Respondent in the timely preparation of her 
51
 It should be noted that the trial court made no findings whatsoever 
regarding Respondent's argument that the Decree of Divorce should be set aside on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. See R. 247-248; see also Exhibit "F". For 
farther discussion regarding the trial court's failure to make adequate findings of fact, see 
supra, Part II. 
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responses to Petitioner's Discovery Requests and the prior counsel's failure to respond to 
the discovery request, resulted in a sanction of a default judgment against Respondent. 
Even though Respondent expressed confusion with respect to complying with the 
discovery requests and even though she attempted to contact him many times, her prior 
counsel ignored her reasonable requests for assistance. 
Moreover, without any notice to Respondent, prior counsel suddenly and 
inexplicably terminated his representation while the discovery requests were still pending. 
While Respondent's prior counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal on about April 20, 2004, 
and Petitioner filed his Motion to Compel on about April 21, 2004,52 prior counsel did not 
tell her of his withdrawal or of the Motion to Compel until she contacted him again on or 
about May 11, 2004. Prior counsel's failure to timely respond to Discovery Requests, his 
failure to communicate or correspond with Respondent, his withdrawal as counsel while a 
discovery request was still pending, and his failure to timely notify Respondent of his 
withdrawal, despite his knowledge that a Motion to Compel (which was sent to prior 
counsel's office) had been filed, were objectively deficient and seriously prejudiced 
Respondent's interests and the outcome of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to adequately 
consider Respondent's claim of a due process violation. Additionally, the trial court 
abused it discretion, in a number of other way in denying Respondent's Motion to Set 
52
 Thus Respondent's prior counsel avoided, by one day, the necessity of 
seeking Court permission to withdraw as counsel. See Utah R. Civ. P. 74(a) (If a motion 
is pending, an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.) 
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Aside, including (1) by failing to set forth adequate findings of fact to support its Ruling; 
(2) by failing to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the basis of Respondent's arguments 
of mistake and excusable neglect; (3) by failing to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the 
basis of Respondent's arguments of fraud against Respondent and against the trial court; 
and (4) by failing to set aside the Decree of Divorce on the basis of Respondent's 
arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Petitioner's arguments that the trial court either ordered a shorter notice period, or 
alternatively, the trial court's error was harmless are both inaccurate and are not 
supported by fact and law. 
Based on the arguments presented above, the trial court's Ruling denying 
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside is ripe for reversal. Accordingly, Respondent's appeal 
should be granted and the trial court's Ruling, denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside 
the Decree of Divorce, should be reversed. 
DATED this ^ ^ a y of October, 2005. 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
C.VyQc MORLEY 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed, first class, two true and accurate 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT , this 26th day of October, 2005 to: 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
1st South Main, Suite 205, P.O. Box 7 X . ^ 
Manti, UT 84642 C^A/t^fih 
\\ Secretary 
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C. Val Morley, Bar No. 6942 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
Facsimile: (801) 756-7659 
Attorneys Respondent 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VAN O. PETERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KORRTN PETERSON, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE APPEAL 
Case No. 034600189 
Judge PAUL D. LYMAN 
1. Notice is hereby given that Respondent and Appellant, Korrin Peterson, by and through 
her counsel of record, C. Val Morley of Witt Morley & Anderson, P.C, appeals, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h), to the Utah Court of Appeals the final Order and Ruling 
issued by the Honorable Paul D. Lyman denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside 
Decree of Divorce and entered in this matter on April 21, 2005. 
2. The appeal is taken from the entire Order and Ruling and from the Honorable Paul D. 
Lyman's failure to address all grounds set forth by Respondent in support of her Motion 
/ / / 
/ / / 
il
 "3 ! 'If LC ' J i 
z^_tMMA 
to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, and from the Honorable Paul D. Lyman's failure to set 
aside the default Decree of Divorce entered in this matter. 
DATED this t 5 . day of May, 2005. 
WITT MORLEY & ANDERSON, P.C. 
C. VAt/MORLEY / ) 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this *£3 day of May 2005,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
NOTICE TO APPEAL to be mailed via first class to: 
Douglas Neeley 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, UT 84623 
—b=c: 
LEGAL ASSISTANT 
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Rule 6, Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the 
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of 
the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under 
subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended 
by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action 
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and 
under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the 
continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or 
expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any act 
or take any proceeding in any civil action that has been pending before it. 
(d) Notice of hearings. Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 
days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed 
by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be 
made on ex parte application. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or 
is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period 
after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of the prescribed 
period as calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal 
holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period under this 
subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a Saturday, a 
Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day 
that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2000; November 
1, 2001; November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.) 
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tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to 
other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(a)(1) Appropriate court An application for an order to a party may be made 
to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a 
deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. An 
application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall be made to the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(a)(2) Motion. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any 
other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The 
motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred 
or attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure in an effort to 
secure the disclosure without court action. 
<a)(2)(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted 
under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or_a party fails to answer an interrogatory 
submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may 
move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order 
compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include 
a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to 
secure the information or material without court action. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or 
adjourn the examination before applying for an order. 
(a)(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of 
this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to 
be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(a)(4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(a)(4)(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery 
is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion 
or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the 
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, includ-
ing attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was filed without the 
movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery 
without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or 
objection was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order 
authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for hearing, require 
the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay to 
the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses 
incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court finds 
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(a)(4)(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after 
opportunity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in rela-
tion to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(b)(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent 
fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the 
court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be 
considered a contempt of that court. 
(b)(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, 
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide 
or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule 
or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b), the 
court in which the action is pending may make such orders hi regard to the 
failure as are just, and among others the following: 
(b)(2)(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing 
designated matters in evidence; 
(b)(2)(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or 
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient 
party; 
(b)(2)(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order 
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order 
to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(b)(2)(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), 
such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, 
unless the party failing to comply is unable to produce such person for 
examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney or both of them to pay 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of 
any document or the t ru th of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the 
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the t ruth of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may 
apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the reasonable 
expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney fees. 
The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held 
objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no 
substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground 
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good 
reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or se?~ve answers to interrog-
atories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) 
to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take 
the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers 
or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service 
of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for 
inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the 
court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized 
under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of 
any order or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act 
or the party's attorney or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act 
has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party or 
attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by 
agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may after opportunity for 
hearing, require such party or attorney to pay to any other party the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior 
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing 
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court may order 
any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees, 
any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury 
of the failure to disclose. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1999; November 1, 2000; April 1, 
2002.) 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
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Rule 104. Divorce decree upon affidavit. 
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing 
in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after 
service of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to the 
withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the entry of the decree or entry of 
default. An affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the application. 
The affidavit shall contain evidence sufficient to support necessary findings of 
fact and a final judgment. 
(Added effective November 1, 2003.) 
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DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH ' 
160 North Main Street, Room 202 •• -
PO Box 100 CA::i 
Manti, UT 84642 Z)\ j 
Telephone: 435-835-2121 Fax: 435-835-2135 ~~ 
Van 0. Peterson, 
vs. 
Korrin Peterson, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
, 
Ruling 
Case No. 034600189 
Assigned Judge: Paul D. Lyman 
The Court has reviewed the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce, the 
Supporting Memorandum; the Memorandum in Opposition, its supporting affidavits; and the 
Respondent's Reply. The Court has also reviewed the file including the mailing addresses on the 
relevant documents, along with the Court's Ruling on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact & 
Conclusion of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
The primary factual dispute in this matter revolves around whether the Respondent was 
sent notices regarding the Court's proceedings after the Court's June 4, 2004 scheduling 
conference. There is no dispute that the Respondent appeared by telephone at that hearing and 
that she had no counsel. She claims that after that date she received no notices, even though they 
were all addressed as they were prior to the scheduling conference. This claim is not credible. 
She also claims that the parties settled the case after the scheduling conference. If the case were 
really settled, why didn't she simply appear at the evidentiary hearing with the signed 
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stipulation? 
The Court has reviewed the file and is still of the opinion, as originally expressed in its 
December 7, 2004 Ruling on Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 
& Conclusion of Law and Decree of Divorce, that the Respondent had adequate notice and chose 
not to appear and not to have counsel present. 
The Court consequently, denies the Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce. 
of April, 2005. 
<&V\svL 
Paul D. Lyman 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On April p j ^ , 2005 a copy of the above Ruling was sent to each of the following by the 
method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) 
C.ValMorley [M ] Douglas L Neeley [P ] 
Witt Morley & Anderson PC Attorney for Petitioner 
110 South Main Street 1st South Main, Suite 205 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
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TRANSCRIPT OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
September 24, 2004 
PRESENT: Judge Lyman, Van Peterson and his attorney, Douglas Neele}7 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
MR. NEELEY: 
Okay. The next case is Van Peterson and Korrin Peterson. This is a 
similar case to what we just did. Is Korrin Peterson here? Near as I can 
tell, Mr. Moody, she's never filed any response to anything that you've 
done on this, uh, recent stuff here and a default was entered against her on 
September 8th. You've asked for a chance to do an evidentiary hearing, do 
you intend on, do you intend on doing just a proffer, or ...? 
Yes, your Honor, the Court — the problem we had was, when we came to 
the Order to Show Cause, she had recently lost her employment because of 
the affair she was having with, uh her boss there at Wal-mart and she had 
moved out of the area, so we didn't, uh, impute income to her at that time 
until she got a full-time job. 
JUDGE LYMAN: Okay. 
We still don't know that she has a full time job although he would proffer 
that he's had numerous conversations with her that, uh, she has bragged to 
him that she's making a lot more money than she did before. That she 
does work as a bartender and at a convenience store. What else was it? 
MR. PETERSON: And at a daycare 
MR. NEELEY: And at a daycare 
JUDGE LYMAN: But she had nothing . . . to show that...? 
MR. NEELEY and MR. PETERSON: 
MR. NEELEY: 
(talking unintelligible) 
She won't - but we asked her to provide all that. So what he would tell 
the court is that the last time she was fully employed because she was with 
Wal-mart, she was earning $9.00 an hour. Since the time that, uh, we had 
the Order to Show Cause, your Honor, Mr. Peterson also testifies that she 
has had, uh, breast augmentation, uh, done. She also has several tattoos 
that she's displaying,.so she's had the ability to pay for those. Uh . . . 
JUDGE LYMAN: Either that or the boyfriend's paying for them. 
MR. NEELEY: Exactly 
JUDGE LYMAN: We don't know for sure. 
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MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
She's actually, your Honor (muffled talking-unintelligible) well, there's 
been four different guys that have come to his house who have helped 
exercise visitation, so. 
I'll grant the relief you've requested. There is one problem in this, I don't 
have any proof that your client is taking the Divorce Education class. 
MR. NEELEY and MR. PETERSON: (unintelligible talking) 
MR. NEELEY: Can we then, do the income on her at $9.00 an hour, your Honor? 
JUDGE LYMAN: Yes, you can. 
MR. NEELEY: Okay. 
JUDGE LYMAN: But when's he going to take the Divorce Education? 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
He'll get that done within the next (muffled client and attorney talking) (2 
weeks?) 
Okay, uh, alright, in this case then, do you want to present any other 
evidence, $9.00 an hour, his income, you've got verification of somewhere 
...? 
We do, we do 
Uh, and $9.00 an hour is fine, that's, uh, 
We'd also said that the court ought to do, to make an equitable division of 
the marital debts. He's taken care of those. 
JUDGE LYMAN: Okay. 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
Debts — We also ask the court to award the personal property as it has 
already been divided. 
As it stands. Is there any real property? 
There is real property. He had a home prior to the marriage and, uh, 
So it's pre-marital property. 
Yes. 
So, she's obviously giving up her claim to it by not appearing here. So...? 
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MR. NEELEY: Your honor, there are two income tax returns that, uh, we've tried to get 
her to sign also, I mean income tax checks. We've tried to get her to sign 
those. She has not, uh, been willing to do that. What do you want to do? 
JUDGE LYMAN: Uh, there's not a lot I can do on it. 
MR. NEELEY: Can we put on the order that she's ordered to sign those? 
JUDGE LYMAN: That's fine, you can do that. How much are they for? 
MR. NEELEY: Uh, the federal is for $ 1,086.00, the state is for $275.00. 
JUDGE LYMAN: Are you intending to split them with her? 
MR. PETERSON: I offered her a third of it, and she wouldn't do it. 
MR. NEELEY: The reason he offered her that, your Honor is because she hasn't - the 
parties have been separated now for many months. She's not paid any, uh 
MR. PETERSON: Ten months. 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
Ten months. 
Was she part of though, the information that was submitted on these 
things? Did you use her income information and his income? 
It was a joint tax return. 
Okay, then I think it-- they just need to be split 50-50. 
Okay. 
And so, split 50-50 and she's ordered to sign them, and he's ordered to 
give her half the money from them. 
MR. PETERSON: What beginning dates should I use for the child support? 
JUDGE LYMAN: Uh, when did you file this? 
MR. PETERSON: Ten months ago. 
JUDGE LYMAN: And you believe she's been employed throughout that time period? 
MR. PETERSON: She has. 
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JUDGE LYMAN: Okay, 
MR. PETERSON and MR. NEELEY: (Unintelligible) 
JUDGE LYMAN: And you filed this in December? Use that date, December 18th. 
MR. PETERSON: For the child support? 
JUDGE LYMAN: Yes, sir. 
MR. PETERSON. Okay, thank you. 
MR. NEELEY: Can we apply....can he have a judgement for what has not been paid since 
that time? In the Decree? 
JUDGE LYMAN: That's - that's fine. Are you going to have ORS collecting this? 
MR. NEELEY: Yes. 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
MR. NEELEY: 
JUDGE LYMAN: 
Okay, that should be in there, too. 
Alright 
Alright 
Thank you. 
Thank you. 
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Douglas L. Neeley (Bar # 6290) 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, UT 84642 
Telephone: (435) 835-5055 
Facsimile: (435) 835-5057 
Attorney For Plaintiffs 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VAN O. PETERSON, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
KORRIN PETERSON, 
Respondent/ Appellant 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Trial Court No. 034600189 
Appellate Court No. 20050472 
COMES NOW the Petitioner/Appellee, Van O. Peterson, by and through 
his attorney Douglas L. Neeley and hereby submits this Memorandum Of Points 
And Authorities In Opposition To Motion For Summary Disposition. Based on 
the facts of this case, Appellant Korrin Peterson's Motion for Summary 
Disposition should be denied. 
Argument 
Appellant Korrin Peterson argues that the Honorable Trial Judge committed 
manifest error by denying Appellant's motion for relief under Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
60. This is a high burden to meet. Appellant has failed to demonstrate the 
manifest error required by Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Manifest error is error that is obvious. State v. Menzies. 845 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 
1992); TDM. Inc. v. Tax Comm'n. 2004 UT App 433. This Court also can defer 
r
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ruling on a Motion for Summary Disposition until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case, Utah R. App. Pro. 10(f). 
Appellant Korrin Peterson's basic argument is that the trial court failed to 
consider her arguments regarding due process. This is incorrect In fact on this 
issue her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Summary Disposition is 
practically a duplicate of her Memorandum in Support of her Motion for Relief 
under Rule 60 she submitted to the trial court. 
Her argument is basically a question of timing—whether the trial court 
granted her sufficient notice of the Evidentiary Hearing. Rule 69(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure govern notices for hearings. Five days notice is required, 
"unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court." 
In this case, the trial court, by denying the Appellant's Rule 60 Motion, 
which contained the exact same argument, clearly fixed a shorter time for the 
Hearing. Thus, the rules were followed. 
Additionally, even if the trial court committed an error, this error was 
harmless. Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Rule 104. Divorce decree upon affidavit 
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a 
hearing in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely 
appearance after service of process or other appropriate notice, waives 
notice, stipulates to the withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the 
entry of the decree or entry of default. An affidavit in support of the 
decree shall accompany the application. The affidavit shall contain 
evidence sufficient to support necessary findings of fact and a final 
judgment 
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In this case, the facts are clear—a default certificate had been issued. Thus, 
there was no need for the hearing at all. In fact, the divorce decree had been 
issued, based almost exclusively on the Petitioner/Appellee Van Peterson's 
verified complaint, as this Court can see once the record is assembled. 
Since the hearing was not necessary for the divorce decree to be entered, 
the failure, if any, of the trial court in terms of notice is not fatal. The trial court 
did not commit manifest error, nor violate any due process rights of the Appellant, 
Korrin Peterson. She had no right to the hearing at all, and thus notice was not 
important. 
Appellant raises the question of whether the Trial Court made sufficient 
findings of fact to support its ruling, and suggests that the Trial court did not, and 
that this is a manifest error. Appellee Van Peterson notes that this question may 
depend on the record being assembled—especially since trial court's ruling on the 
Rule 60 Motion in question refers to other findings on this subject. Therefore, the 
Appellee respectfully urges this Court to defer ruling on this issue until the record 
is complete and assembled. 
Furthermore, the Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to strike Appellant 
Korrin Peterson's Exhibit "D'\ the alleged transcript of the evidentiary hearing. 
Appellant prepared this "transcript"—not by a licensed court reporter or someone 
else licensed to prepare transcripts. Nor has Appellant filed a request for 
transcripts in this case. Thus, Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to Strike 
Appellee's Exhibit "D." 
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Conclusion 
Since the Honorable Trial Judge shortened the notice requirement, and 
since the hearing was not required anyway, the trial court did not commit manifest 
error when the court denied Appellant Korrin Peterson's Rule 60 motion. 
Therefore, Appellant Korrin Peterson's Motion for Summary Disposition should 
be denied. In addition, since the question of whether the Trial Court made 
sufficient findings, Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to defer ruling on that 
portion of this Motion until the Record is assembled. Appellee Van Peterson also 
asks this Court to strike Appellant's Exhibit "D," as it is not a proper transcript, 
nor prepared by a person certified to prepare transcripts. Additionally, Appellee, 
prays for his attorney's fees and costs in order to respond to Appellant's motion. 
Douglas LrNeeley s. f 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this (/) day of My, 2005,1 faxed and mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To Motion 
For Summary Disposition, postage prepaid, to C. Val Morley, Attorney for Respondent, at 
facsimile: (801)785-0853,110 South Main Street. Pleasant Grove, Utah, 84062. 
